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RULE VIOLATIONS AND THE RULE OF LAW:
A FACTORIAL SURVEY OF PUBLIC ATTITUDES*
N.J. Schweitzer,** Douglas J. Sylvester*** & Michael J. Saks****
Where law ends, tyranny begins.
-William Pitt, the younger, British Prime Minister
(1783-1801, 1804-1806)
Good people do not need laws to tell them to act responsibly, while bad
people will find a way around the laws.
-Plato
INTRODUCTION
The rule of law is no simple subject; it is not even easy to define
what the rule of law means. Yet people go to great lengths to demon-
strate their adherence to the principles of the rule of law. An underly-
ing assumption of those who advocate a formal view of the rule of law
is that there is an inherent value in adhering to rules. But is that as-
sumption valid? Of what importance are rules, and what conse-
quences do those who violate rules suffer in the eyes of others?
In this Article, we present the findings of a factorial survey explor-
ing questions about the rule of law. Part II provides background on
the theory, nature, and meaning of the rule of law, as each area in-
formed our study. Part III describes the survey, in which respondents
answered general questions about the rule of law and evaluated par-
ticular situations in which rules were violated for different reasons.
Parts IV and V present and explain the study's findings.
Although respondents expressed nearly unanimous support for the
general importance of the rule of law, their reactions to the case sce-
narios showed a strong sensitivity to the particular facts of each situa-
tion-especially the purposes that motivated the violations. These
findings lend support to the view that whatever the cultural or psycho-
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logical preference for rules over outcomes, or strict equality over fair-
ness, there may be circumstances in which most people are willing to
make situation-specific assessments of what is just.
II. THE RULE OF LAW IN POLITICAL RHETORIC
AND LEGAL THEORY
Invocations of the rule of law abound in contemporary culture. It
seems we cannot open a newspaper or turn on the news without hear-
ing how some government initiative or decision either complies with
or violates it. Pundits, of course, will argue both sides. As public de-
bates rage over the federal government's antiterrorism efforts, one
thing remains constant-everyone claims to have the rule of law on
their side.' The question is why? What is it about the rule of law that
makes pundits and politicians believe that it matters? What do they
think will happen, and what do they hope to achieve when they claim
something violates it?2
The desire to justify or criticize deeply contested actions and poli-
cies by resort to the rule of law is neither new nor surprising. The rule
1. The Bush administration's decision to engage in warrantless wiretapping to combat domes-
tic terrorism is the most recent example of the rule of law being invoked to both condemn and
support a program. Some criticized the President for "ignor[ing] the rule of law." Maxine Wa-
ters, President's Wiretapping Ignores the Constitution, ROLL CALL, Feb. 13, 2006, at 10. Others
criticized the President for his willingness "to trample the rule of law and constitutional guaran-
tees." Stephen Dinan, Patriot Act Wins Senate Approval: House Likely to Pass Measure, WASH.
TIMES, Mar. 3, 2006, at Al (quoting Senator Russell D. Feingold). The response from the ad-
ministration's supporters also sought justification in legality. Attorney General Alberto Gonza-
les, for example, appeared before Congress and on numerous media programs, arguing that the
program was in perfect accord with the rule of law. According to Gonzales's testimony, "The
terrorist surveillance program is necessary, it is lawful, and it respects the civil liberties that we
all cherish." Michael Bowman, Debate About Terrorist Wiretapping Continues (Feb. 20, 2006),
http://www.voanews.com/english/archive/2006-02/Debate-About-Terrorist-Wiretapping-contin-
ues.cfm. In August 2006, a federal district court ruled that the surveillance was unconstitutional.
See ACLU v. NSA, 438 F. Supp. 2d 754 (E.D. Mich. 2006). The decision has been appealed.
2. See, e.g., James G. Wilson, The Role of Public Opinion in Constitutional Interpretation, 1993
BYU L. REV. 1037. Professor Wilson noted President Abraham Lincoln's approach:
Abraham Lincoln, who had earlier glorified the rule of law, became a Humean political
analyst, asserting that "[o]ur government rests in public opinion. Whoever can change
public opinion, can change the government, practically, just so much." While Presi-
dent, Lincoln justified his aggressive tactics against the Southern rebellion, such as jail-
ing hostile Maryland legislators and other dissidents, because the public would retain
the last word about the validity of these actions through the electoral and impeachment
processes. At critical points, constitutional trust is more important than constitutional
law.
Id. at 1080-81 (alteration in original) (citations omitted); accord PATRICIA J. WILLIAMS, THE
ROOSTER'S EGc 69 (1995) ("There are any number of junctures in history where a shift in the
boundaries of law or some political movement has been signaled by very particular uses of rheto-
ric, peculiar twists of the popular imagination.").
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of law has been a tool of political rhetoric for centuries, and it has
been employed in many ways. 3 Its "will-o'-the-wisp" 4 nature may ex-
plain its prevalence and persistence. The rule of law can mean differ-
ent things to different people: one can allege violations of the rule of
law to attack both foreign governments and the President of the
United States, for abuses of authority and personal indiscretions. As a
result, many use the rule of law in a partisan fashion-not as a real
normative complaint about a given action.
Such uses generally invoke the idea that people should "follow the
rules." Accusing someone of violating the rule of law simpliciter is
tantamount to calling that person a rulebreaker and, therefore, some-
one to be mistrusted, condemned, or punished. In addition, accusing
an institution or administration of disregarding the rule of law is
clearly an attempt to delegitimize that institution in the eyes of the
public.5 Conveying the idea that one does or does not follow the rules
is often the point of rule of law criticisms.6 Viewing the rule of law in
3. See, e.g., BRIAN Z. TAMANAHA, ON THE RULE OF LAW: HISTORY, POLITICS, THEORY
60-72 (2004); Jonathan Rose. The Rule of Law in the Western World: An Overview, 35 J. Soc.
PHIL. 457, 457 (2004) ("The various ideas contained in Rule of Law are very old .... ). Most
trace the origins of the modern conception of the rule of law to Professor A.V. Dicey. Dicey
explained his vision:
We mean, in the first place, that no man is punishable or can be lawfully made to
suffer in body or goods except for a distinct breach of law established in the ordinary
legal manner before the ordinary Courts of the land.
We mean in the second place .. . not only that with us no man is above the law, but
(what is a different thing) that here every man, whatever be his rank or condition, is
subject to the ordinary law of the realm and amenable to the jurisdiction of the ordi-
nary tribunals.
A.V. DICEY, INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY OF THE LAW OF THE CONSTITUTION 179-85 (5th ed.
1897) (citation omitted). These basic components of the rule of law have been echoed in numer-
ous other theories. See, e.g., Arthur L. Goodhart, The Rule of Law and Absolute Sovereignty,
106 U. PA. L. REV. 943, 945 n.4 (1958); Todd J. Zywicki, The Rule of Law, Freedom, and Pros-
perity, 10 Sup. CT. ECON. REV. 1, 3 (2003) (summarizing Dicey's theory in three points: "(1) the
supremacy of regular law as opposed to arbitrary power, i.e., the rule of law, not men; (2) equal-
ity before the law of all persons and classes, including governmental officials; and (3) the incor-
poration of constitutional law as a binding part of the ordinary law of the land").
4. Lillian R. BeVier, Civilization, Progress, and the Rule of Law, in THE RULE OF LAW IN THE
WAKE OF CLINTON 19, 22 (Roger Pilon ed., 2000) (arguing that formal theories of the rule of law
"pursue a will-o'-the-wisp"); Allan C. Hutchinson & Patrick Monahan, Democracy and the Rule
of Law, in LAW AND MORALITY: READINGS IN LEGAL PHILOSOPHY 340, 343 (David Dyzenhaus
& Arthur Ripstein eds., 2d ed. 2001) ("In short, [the rule of law] is the will-o'-the-wisp of consti-
tutional history.").
5. This seems true even if the critic believes, on principled ground, that the institution or
administration has acted in violation of the rule of law.
6. The question of institutional legitimacy in legal theory and its link to issues of legitimacy
has been explored mainly in the social psychology literature. See infra notes 8-30 and accompa-
nying text; cf Janice Nadler, Flouting the Law, 83 TEX. L. REV. 1399 (2005) (suggesting that
people react to a single law they view as unjust by losing respect for and flouting other, unrelated
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these terms makes the rhetorical claims of its supporters clear. It is a
battle over legitimacy and popular support. This presumes that the
public views rulebreaking as a wrong in itself, and would be willing to
withdraw its support from those who break rules, regardless of why
rules are broken or what is accomplished by breaking them.
That said, it has never been sufficient to merely rely on arguments
that a given action or policy is within the rules. To shield various ac-
tions from criticism, proponents and critics often lay claim to other
expediencies; a given action may be morally correct, motivated by na-
tional security concerns, or otherwise "necessary"-whether legal or
not.7 We can safely assume that these considerations are invoked be-
cause they too are believed to influence public opinion about the legit-
imacy or wisdom of a given action.
The interplay between legality and expediency raises further ques-
tions. Do rules matter more than justifications? Are we more likely
to condemn conduct because it violates rules than if it does not? Do
we value adherence to rules more than good conduct, however that is
defined? More broadly, how do rules influence attitudes about the
acceptability of official decisionmaking? Are we more likely to agree
with actions that conform to rules, to ideological or philosophical jus-
tifications, or to plain common sense? In short, does the adherence to
rules carry independent normative force, or is it a second-order con-
sideration in determining the appropriateness or desirability of a given
action or policy?
The role that rules play in influencing people's perceptions about
the rule of law, legitimacy, and justice is an empirical question that has
received little attention to date. The lack of empirical research on the
precise question has not prevented some in the legal profession from
making strong claims about people's preferences. Legal scholars have
laws, and offering experimental evidence in support of people's expressed intentions to obey or
flout everyday laws, as well as evidence that mock jurors who view one law as unjust are more
willing to nullify other laws).
7. Almost invariably, officials acting in violation of the law justify their conduct by alleging
some necessity or socially desirable result that is served by not honoring the rule. This was
evident to British Prime Minister William Pitt: "Necessity is the plea for every infringement of
human freedom. It is the argument of tyrants; it is the creed of slaves." William Pitt, Prime
Minister, Speech to the House of Commons on the India Bill (Nov. 18, 1783). It is further
evident in the current debate over President George W. Bush's ordering of electronic eavesdrop-
ping of communications into and out of the United States. Defenders of the President's conduct
point predominantly to the socially desirable consequence sought to be achieved-national se-
curity. Critics of the President's conduct point to its lawlessness-that it violates the Fourth
Amendment, the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, 50 U.S.C. §§ 1801-1811, 1821-1829,
1841-1846, 1861-1862 (2000), and the Supreme Court's most relevant holding in Youngstown
Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952), which agreed with the President's goals, but
argued that he could have, and should have, conducted himself within the law.
[Vol. 56:615
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often made predictions about the value that rules have in the public's
mind, and have based theories of the rule of law on their intuitions
about people's innate preferences. It is these claims we seek to test
through our empirical research.
A. Rules, Legitimacy, and the Rule of Law in Legal Theory
One of the principal challenges of conducting empirical research on
the rule of law is the difficulty of defining the concept. The rule of law
has been the subject of intense theoretical inquiry for much of the last
century. Its precise parameters have been so hotly debated that, to
many, the rule of law is now incapable of precise definition. As one
scholar put it, "[W]e are never quite sure what we mean by the rule of
law."'8 Despite the inherent imprecision in the term, it is possible to
set out some basic theories while admittedly glossing over much of the
complexity.
The poles of the debate are generally cast in terms of a "thin" or
"formalist" version of the rule of law and a "thick" or "substantive"
version. For a thorough discussion of the intricacies of the thin and
thick versions, we strongly recommend works that take a more com-
prehensive approach. 9 It is sufficient for our purposes, though, to fo-
cus on those aspects of the debate that implicate rhetorical and
empirical uses. To this narrow end, we concentrate primarily on the
writings of Justice Antonin Scalia and other scholars who argue for a
"formalist" version of the rule of law.
Whatever the difference among legal theorists, they agree that rules
are the basis of the rule of law. In addition, there is substantial con-
sensus that certain conditions must be imposed on rules in order to
serve the rule of law: rules must be clear, general, public, prospective,
and stable.10 In addition to these formal criteria, there is a general
8. GEORGE P. FLETCHER, BASIC CONCEPTS OF LEGAL THOUGHT 12 (1996) (internal quota-
tion marks omitted); accord Richard H. Fallon, Jr., "The Rule of Law" as a Concept in Constitu-
tional Discourse, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 1 (1997) (stating that the rule of law "has always been
contested"); Margaret Jane Radin, Reconsidering the Rule of Law, 69 B.U. L. REV. 781, 791
(1989) ("[Tlhe Rule of Law... is deeply ambiguous, a contested concept."). The rule of law is
probably an "essentially contested concept," incapable of universal definition or understanding.
See W.B. GALLIE, PHILOSOPHY AND THE HISTORICAL UNDERSTANDING 157-91 (1964).
9. See generally T.R.S. ALLAN, CONSTITUTIONAL JUSTICE: A LIBERAL THEORY OF THE RULE
OF LAW (2001); TAMANAHA, supra note 3.
10. Cass R. Sunstein, Problems with Rules, 83 CAL. L. REV. 953, 968 (1995). Professor Sun-
stein has catalogued the various conditions necessary for a legal system to be considered under
the rule of law:
(1) clear, general, publicly accessible rules laid down in advance; (2) prospectivity and a
ban on retroactivity; (3) a measure of conformity between law in the books and law in
the world; (4) hearing rights and availability of review by independent adjudicative
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view-less widely held-that the system of laws must take into ac-
count the shared values and understandings of the society it governs."I
The battleground for competing theories of the rule of law is generally
found in this latter point, as theorists depart dramatically on the na-
ture of the values and understandings that the rules must reflect.
It is difficult, if not impossible, to identify widely shared values or
understandings within our pluralistic society. In the past, most theo-
rists argued that nhtural law traditions-often reflecting a Christian
ethic-were sufficiently widespread that the law could and should re-
flect such values. The breakdown of natural law values has led to an
erosion of the ideal that legal rules embody higher moral principles.
Today, "no fact seems to be plainer in the modern world than the
extent and depth of moral disagreement, often enough disagreement
on basic issues. ' '12 Even so, "[a] society which aims to achieve long-
term peace and stability must craft its laws in harmony with estab-
lished understandings and shared values.' 13
In the place of the more substantive or thick version of the rule of
law, contemporary theorists have increasingly adopted a more formal-
ist or thin version.' 4 The formalist ideal of the rule of law places tre-
mendous importance on reducing the tension between administering
the law and imposing personal values on it. The key to this reduction
officials; (5) separation between law-making and law-implementation; (6) no rapid
changes in the content of law; and (7) no contradictions or inconsistency in the law.
Id. (citation omitted); accord GEOFFREY DE 0. WALKER, THE RULE OF LAW: FOUNDATION OF
CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY 24-42 (1988) (offering twelve conditions).
The view that rules must be known, understood, and capable of being followed is characteris-
tic of every theory of the rule of law. JOSEPH RAz, The Rule of Law and Its Virtue, in THE
AUTHORITY OF LAW: ESSAYS ON LAW AND MORALITY 210, 213 (1979) (arguing that the rule of
law must satisfy two goals: "(1) that people should be ruled by the law and obey it, and (2) that
the law should be such that people will be able to be guided by it"); see also Radin, supra note 8,
at 785 (stating that "there must be rules" and "those rules must be capable of being followed").
Professor T.R.S. Allan summarized Lon Fuller's view of the rule of law: "Rules should not
merely be general, in the sense that they should apply to all citizens and all events falling within
appropriately specified conditions, but their terms should be clear and capable of obedience.
Rules should therefore normally be prospective, and should be reasonably stable in content
.T.R.S. Allan, The Rule of Law as the Rule of Reason: Consent and Constitutionalism, 115
LAW Q. REV. 221, 226 (1999); see also LON L. FULLER, THE MORALITY OF LAW (rev. ed. 1969).
11. See Allan, supra note 10, at 231 ("At the heart of the ideal of the rule of law, properly
understood, is a principle requiring governmental action to be rationally justified in terms of
some conception of the common good.").
12. Alasdair Maclntyre, Theories of Natural Law in the Culture of Advanced Modernity, in
COMMON TRUTHS: NEW PERSPECTIVES ON NATURAL LAW 91, 93 (Edward B. McLean ed.,
2000).
13. Sean Coyle, Positivism, Idealism and the Rule of Law, 26 OXFORD J. LEOAL STUD. 257,
286 (2006).
14. TAMANAHA, supra note 3, at 111 ("[Flormal legality is the dominant understanding of the
rule of law among legal theorists .... ").
[Vol. 56:615
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is emphasizing the importance of rules over discretion. As one com-
mentator noted, "To fulfill this role ... legal rules must embody au-
thoritative, determinate standards essentially distinct from the
interpretive principles pursued in open-ended moral discussion."' 5
The debate is whether the rule of law is best served by rules or
standards. The difference, simply put, is the amount of discretion
placed in the hands of decisionmakers. Rules are generally consid-
ered clearer articulations of the law and, as a result, serve the goals of
the thin version of the rule of law. Standards, on the other hand, pro-
vide greater discretion to decisionmakers, allowing them to include
more substantive considerations in the law's application and enforce-
ment. A classic example is the difference between a standard that
states "drivers of automobiles may not operate their vehicles at unsafe
speeds," and a rule that declares "drivers of automobiles may not ex-
ceed fifty-five miles per hour." In the former, the standard gives the
decisionmaker the discretion to seek individualized justice or fairness
by considering other factors-weather conditions, the skill of the
driver, traffic, etc. In the latter, the certainty of the rule promotes the
goals of the thin version by ensuring the subject of the law under-
stands exactly what constitutes a violation and leaving the deci-
sionmaker without discretion.' 6 The focus on the clarity of rules is an
attempt to cabin the discretion of decisionmakers to interfere with
what adherents to the thin version of the rule of law continue to argue
are the preeminent values of our legal and political systems-consis-
tency and equality.
The most influential proponent of this version of the rule of law in
contemporary debate is Justice Scalia. The elevation of rules in his
theory is made clear by his formulation of "the rule of law as a law of
rules.' 7 Scalia thinks that "only clear legal rules can further the rule
of law."' 18 This formalist view-that rules are the paramount method
for upholding the rule of law-is essential to restrict, as he sees it, the
danger that decisionmakers in legal systems will impose their view of
what is fair in given circumstances. The problem with seeking fairness
is that it comes at the cost of consistency.1 9 According to Scalia,
15. Coyle, supra note 13, at 264-65 (emphasis added).
16. This assumes that the rule contains an equally clear and unequivocal standard of proof and
punishment.
17. Antonin Scalia, The Rule of Law as a Law of Rules, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 1175 (1989)
[hereinafter Scalia, Law of Rules].
18. Eric J. Segall, Justice Scalia, Critical Legal Studies, and the Rule of Law, 62 GEO. WASH. L.
REV. 991, 999 (1994).
19. Scalia argues that the mandate of "consistency over fairness" is even more important in
judge-made law:
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"Consistency is the very foundation of the rule of law."'20 Consistency
is nothing less than the maxim that "persons similarly situated should
be similarly treated-that is to say, the principle that the law must be
consistent.121 Thus, in a system of law that values fairness, the rule of
law is synonymous with equality and consistency.
It is fair, then, to ensure that like cases are treated alike-not to aim
for the best moral outcome in a given case. Scalia is unequivocal:
"The rule of law is about form .... Long live formalism. It is what
makes a government a government of laws and not of men."' 22 Scalia
and others understand consistency and equality either as a moral re-
quirement of the rule of law or as a condition of justice.
Even advocates of a more substantive or thick conception of the
rule of law agree that rules- are important. 23 In addition, they gener-
ally agree about what kinds of rules are necessary to achieve the rule
of law-a consensus that reflects, almost perfectly, the conception
contained in the thin version. The main difference is that advocates of
the thicker version of the rule of law require that the outcomes of
their systems meet an exogenous moral standard. One way to con-
sider the difference is to view the conditions imposed on rules as im-
portant to advocates of the thick theory, yet essential to advocates of
the thin theory. In other words, to proponents of the thick version,
rules should be general, stable, and prospective, provided adherence
to these principles does not interfere with other moral values, such as
When [a rule as contained in an] elaborate intellectual structure produces a result that
seems to the judge patently "unfair" or contrary to governing text, it is not acceptable
for him to disregard the structure .... If he cannot [formulate a compatible rule-based
rationale for his deviation], then (the theory of our system holds) his notions of fairness
... are simply out of whack, and he must subordinate them to the law.
Antonin Scalia, Assorted Canards of Contemporary Legal Analysis, 40 CASE W. RES. L. REV.
581, 589 (1989-1990) [hereinafter Scalia, Contemporary Legal Analysis].
20. Id. at 588.
21. Id.
22. ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW 25
(1997). Professor Brian Tamanaha has described the connection between the rule of law and
legal formalism as follows:
It is of paramount significance to recognize that the rule of law understood in terms
of formal legality boils down to the nature of rules .... "Law" in essence is comprised
of rules .... The function (and definition) of rules is to serve as general guides of
behavior .... Rules are formal by nature; so law is formal by nature; so the rule of law
is formal by nature.
... In the end there is nothing distinctive about the formal rule of law as a separate
ideal. It is about (legal) rules.
TAMANAHA, supra note 3, at 96-97.
23. TAMANAHA, supra note 3, at 102 ("All substantive versions of the rule of law incorporate
the elements of the formal rule of law, then go further, adding on various content
specifications.").
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justice, distributive equity, or democracy. To proponents of the thin
version, any attempt to circumvent rules for other substantive values
is, by definition, a violation of the rule of law because it results in
inconsistent or unequal treatment of citizens. Thus, rules must meet
these conditions.
In the end, however, "[t]here is no academic consensus regarding
what kind or how much of a substantive component the rule of law
requires," 24 and the bases of disagreement are normative rather than
empirical. Finally, advocates of the substantive theory implicitly agree
that the rule of law should focus more on outcomes than on whether
the decisions were reached in some formally acceptable manner.
To Scalia, the principles of equality and consistency are at once nor-
mative and instrumental. The lack of agreement on substantive moral
outcomes that Scalia and others see in modern society means that jus-
tice, as a goal of any version of the rule of law, must be served by
other values. Scalia's declaration that "[t]he Equal Protection Clause
epitomizes justice more than any other provision of the Constitu-
tion"'25 reveals his view of which values must be served. Professor
T.R.S. Allan has echoed Scalia's belief that equality and consistency
are necessary conditions for justice: "The idea of the rule of law is
also inextricably linked with certain basic institutional arrangements.
The fundamental notion of equality, which lies close to the heart of
our convictions about justice and fairness ... may today be taken to
be a central strand of the rule of law."26
Yet, the thin version of the rule of law requires equality and consis-
tency for reasons beyond their normative connection to justice. Of
particular significance for our research is the claim that equality and
consistency are not just moral considerations, but are also linked to
people's intuitive sense of fairness. According to Scalia, one aspect of
this claim is historical: "[Y]ou will search long and hard to find any-
one, in any age, who would reject the fundamental principle underly-
ing the equal protection clause: that persons similarly situated should
be similarly treated .... ",27 This historical claim is, for Scalia, evi-
dence that equality and consistency are psychologically driven impera-
tives, and always have been. Professor Kent Greenawalt has made
24. Segall, supra note 18, at 996.
25. Scalia, Law of Rules, supra note 17, at 1178.
26. T.R.S. ALLAN, LAW, LIBERTY, AND JUSTICE: THE LEGAL FOUNDATIONS OF BRITISH CON-
STITUTIONALISM 22 (1993); accord Allan, supra note 10, at 231 ("The formal equality ensured by
the regular and impartial application of rules to all those within their purview is supplemented
by a more substantive equality, or notion of equal citizenship.").
27. Scalia, Contemporary Legal Analysis, supra note 19, at 588.
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similar claims about the "deep-rooted feelings" of people in Western
society towards concepts of equality and consistency.28
The claim that people inherently view equality and consistency as
synonymous with justice is, ultimately, an intuition that Scalia and
others have about human psychology. This intuition is articulated by
Scalia:
[O]ne of the most substantial.., competing values [to perfection in
legal decisionmaking] ... is the appearance of equal treatment. As
a motivating force of the human spirit, that value cannot be overes-
timated. Parents know that children will accept quite readily all
sorts of arbitrary substantive dispositions .... But try to let one
brother or sister watch television when the others do not, and you
will feel the fury of the fundamental sense of justice unleashed.29
Allan is more explicit, detailing how "[t]he ideal of equality and
rationality of which the rule of law truly consists does not, however,
amount to a controversial conception of social justice or even a theory
of democracy. '30 It sidesteps these more "controversial conceptions"
precisely because it is deeply rooted in the psyche of the governed.
To summarize, we have noted that the rule of law has been in crisis
since the breakdown of natural law theories. Second, we have dis-
cussed how theorists of the rule of law continue to hold the view that
our system of laws should or must reflect commonly held values.
Third, these values are equality and consistency, and are best served
by restraining discretion while promoting formal application of rules.
Finally, these notions of equality and consistency, integral to the adop-
tion of formal theories of the rule of law, are grounded mainly in intu-
itive judgments about the nature of human psychology.
Our research is concerned primarily with this last point. Scalia and
others have made claims about the nature of human psychology based
on intuition and historical observation. They have cited no authority
for this claim, but nonetheless allege that these psychological prefer-
ences are the key to understanding the rule of law as a preference for
rules over outcomes. In short, if Scalia and others are correct that we
elevate equality over other values, then a formal application of rules is
not only theoretically preferred, but practically necessary. Legal insti-
28. Kent Greenawalt, "Prescriptive Equality": Two Steps Forward, 110 HARV. L. REV. 1265,
1273 (1997).
29. Scalia, Law of Rules, supra note 17, at 1178. Interestingly, like Scalia, Greenawalt also
uses stories of child-rearing to make his point. Greenawalt, supra note 28, at 1265-66 (telling a
story of his son's desire to take violin lessons because "he did not want to be denied a benefit
given to [his brother], and we, his parents, thought that his desire for equal treatment had some
kind of force").
30. Allan, supra note 10, at 224.
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tutions that do not strictly apply "rules" will violate notions of equal-
ity and, as a result, lose public support.
B. An Empirical Study of the Rule of Law
The present study is certainly not the first empirical research with
implications for the rule of law. But because the rule of law is a large
and complex phenomenon, any particular study or research touches
only a part of the whole. The rule of law invokes procedural rules as
well as substantive rules, and ranges from the means of adopting a
rule to its interpretation, application, adjudication, and enforcement.
There is a risk, then, that we might overgeneralize from one set of
findings and think we know more than we actually do; we may also
find that what appear to be conflicting findings really address different
aspects of the rule of law.
Different empirical studies touch on different parts of that large and
complex problem. For example, research collected under the general
rubric of procedural justice has been concerned not only with formal
procedures and, to a lesser extent, the outcomes of those proceed-
ings,3 1 but also with the general treatment of people by those with the
authority to make decisions or to take action-what we might call col-
lateral procedures-when outcomes are ambiguous. 32 Other research
has focused on people's satisfaction with outcomes and processes, es-
pecially when the participants have been made experimentally omnis-
31. See generally JOHN THIBAUT & LAURENS WALKER, PROCEDURAL JUSTICE: A PSYCHO-
LOGICAL ANALYSIS (1975).
32. See generally Jason Sunshine & Tom Tyler, Moral Solidarity, Identification with the Com-
munity, and the Importance of Procedural Justice: The Police as Prototypical Representatives of a
Group's Moral Values, 66 Soc. PSYCHOL. Q. 153 (2003) (reporting findings based on more ab-
stract feelings of shared values with legal authorities, and contending that marginal members of
society are even more concerned about procedural justice); Tom R. Tyler, The Psychology of
Procedural Justice: A Test of the Group-Value Model, 57 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 830
(1989) (noting that noncontrol factors-group-value variables such as neutrality, trust, and social
standing-have an independent impact on judgments of procedural justice); Tom R. Tyler, Pub-
lic Trust and Confidence in Legal Authorities: What Do Majority and Minority Group Members
Want from the Law and Legal Institutions?, 19 BEHAV. Sci. & L. 215 (2001) (offering an alterna-
tive procedural justice based model of public trust and confidence in police and courts to views
about the manner in which legal authorities treat the public, and drawing support from psycho-
logical research about public evaluations of institutions and authorities); Tom R. Tyler, What Is
Procedural Justice?: Criteria Used by Citizens to Assess the Fairness of Legal Procedures, 22 LAW
& Soc'Y REv. 103 (1988) (reporting the findings of a study in which hundreds of citizens were
interviewed about their personal experiences with police and courts, and finding that procedural
justice has a major influence on satisfaction with outcomes and the evaluation of legal authori-
ties); Tom R. Tyler et al., Maintaining Allegiance Toward Political Authorities: The Role of Prior
Attitudes and the Use of Fair Procedures, 33 AM. J. POL. Sci. 629 (1989) (finding that people's
experiences with government agencies affect their broader attitudes toward government, and
that this process is not dominated by the favorability of the outcome of the prior encounters).
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cient about the "correct" outcome. 33 Although that research is
voluminous, it touches only a small portion of the rule of law. It has
not dealt with the substance of legal rules but only with process-
often not even with the existence of procedural rules in any formal
sense.
Our study is similarly narrow in focus, though it asks a new ques-
tion: How do people react to substantive violations of a rule by an
official actor? We vary the level of obligation the rule imposes-from
absolute to advisory-and the actor's purpose in violating the rule.
Do individuals uniformly disapprove of rulebreakers, or might they
look past the violation toward some greater good?
III. A FACTORIAL SURVEY
A. Survey Design
Our research was conducted using a factorial survey in which re-
spondents were randomly assigned to receive different information
that reflects different cells of an experimental design. Our experiment
used a 3x3x2 factorial design: three experimental variables were
tested, including three levels of the rule's mandatory/discretionary na-
ture (Rule Strength) and three different purposes for the actor's viola-
tion (Purpose).34 The final variable, a demographic attribute that
distinguishes between lawyers and nonlawyers, was employed as part
of the sampling design. 35
Our respondents were presented with a short scenario that de-
scribed a blind-grading policy that had been recently adopted with
unanimous public and professional support within a fictitious school
district. 36 In this way, the rule is in accord with basic notions of the
33. See, e.g., Elizabeth Mullen & Linda J. Skitka, Exploring the Psychological Underpinnings
of the Moral Mandate Effect: Motivated Reasoning, Group Differentiation, or Anger?, 90 J. PER-
SONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 629 (2006) (finding that the "moral mandate effect" is driven by
people's anger (or pleasure) at seeing their nonpreferred (or preferred) outcomes materialize);
Linda J. Skitka & David A. Houston, When Due Process Is of No Consequence: Moral Man-
dates and Presumed Defendant Guilt or Innocence, 14 Soc. JUST. RES. 305 (2001) (demonstrating
that procedural fairness affects judgments of trial outcomes only when the true guilt or inno-
cence of a defendant is unknown); Linda J. Skitka & Elizabeth Mullen, Understanding Judg-
ments of Fairness in a Real-World Political Context: A Test of the Value Protection Model of
Justice Reasoning, 28 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 1419 (2002) (suggesting that satis-
faction with procedures is dependent upon outcomes that are in accord with one's moral values).
34. This created a total of nine unique conditions.
35. Additional demographic variables-political and geographic-were included in the survey
but are beyond the scope of the present study.
36. The subject of our rule-blind grading of exams-was deliberately mundane and apolitical
so that we might sidestep the prejudices and predilections of our respondents regarding contro-
versial topics currently in the news.
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rule of law: it is general, public, prospective, enacted through appro-
priate measures, and even, although not required by the rule of law,
with the explicit acceptance of the actor in question.
In line with the aforementioned experimental variables, we created
three versions of the blind-grading policy that composed our Rule
Strength manipulation: an "absolute" version, where blind grading is
mandatory; an "opt-out" version, where blind grading is required, but
where case-by-case exemptions are recognized; and a "recommended"
version, where blind grading is strongly encouraged but optional.
The scenario described an instance in which a teacher willfully vio-
lated the blind-grading rule despite the fact that, in all cases, the
teacher was both aware of the rule and had supported its creation.
Again, we created three versions of this portion of the scenario, each
representing a different reason for the rule violation: a "good pur-
pose," where the teacher needed to violate the blind-grading rule in
order to correct a scoring error; an "ambiguous purpose," where the
teacher wanted to adjust the grades based on a subjective evaluation
of the student's performance in the course; and a "bad purpose,"
where the teacher was simply looking to raise the grade of a favored
student and lower the grade of a disliked student. These three varia-
tions composed our Purpose manipulation. One example of these sce-
narios is outlined in Appendix A.
The three Rule Strengths were then matched with one of the Pur-
poses in all possible combinations, resulting in the creation of nine
separate scenarios. 37 In all cases, respondents were exposed to a sin-
gle scenario and, as a result, were not aware of the other variations.
After reading the scenario, the respondents were first presented with
a brief questionnaire that asked them to assess the appropriateness of
the teacher's conduct. The respondents were then given another set
of questions asking their views on rule of law values and dilemmas
more generally. Finally, respondents answered a third set of questions
seeking demographic information: age, gender, occupation, etc. A
copy of the questionnaire is provided in Appendix B.
B. Data Collection
Over the span of two months, 4574 email invitations were sent to
potential respondents in four major urban counties in the United
37. An additional nine scenarios were created that included variations on whether the teacher
actively or passively violated the rule in question. Due to space and time limitations, we leave
our findings on the active versus passive violation foranother time. It should be noted, however,
that the active versus passive manipulations did not affect the results of the research presented
here.
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States: Philadelphia County, Pennsylvania; Cook County, Illinois;
Dallas County, Texas; and Maricopa County, Arizona. These invita-
tions introduced the study and included a link to the webpage that
hosted our survey. After reading a brief instruction page, the respon-
dents clicked another link that randomly assigned them to one of our
nine experimental conditions. Depending on the specific condition to
which they were assigned, respondents viewed one of the nine scena-
rios, followed by the questionnaire. Once they had completed the
questionnaire, the respondents submitted their responses and the data
were recorded in our database. Although we collected various demo-
graphic data, respondents otherwise remained anonymous.
Of the email invitations sent, half targeted lay respondents while
the other half targeted lawyers. Potential lay respondents were identi-
fied through email directories at major universities located within
each of our target counties. Research assistants compiled lists of the
email addresses of noninstructional staff members-accountants, ad-
ministrative assistants, maintenance workers, technical staff, etc. 38
Lawyers' email addresses were identified through online legal directo-
ries. Of the 4574 emails that were sent, 1432 of them were returned as
undeliverable. We received 402 completed survey responses, resulting
in a response rate of 12.8%. 39 A roughly equal number of responses
came from lawyers (n = 192) and lay people (n = 202).40 The respon-
dents averaged forty-one years of age (ranging from nineteen to sixty-
nine years), and both genders were represented approximately equally
(49% female and 51% male).
IV. RESULTS
A. Measures of Appropriateness
We provided the respondents with four questions that asked them
to rate the appropriateness of the teacher's actions without drawing
attention to either the Rule Strength or Purpose manipulations. The
responses to these four questions were examined with an exploratory
factor analysis, 41 which confirmed that the four items were actually
38. To help ensure that our respondents represented a diverse range of education levels, so-
cioeconomic statuses, and ages we did not target faculty or students; however, a small number of
respondents did identify themselves as college instructors or students.
39. This is typical of unsolicited email surveys, which have average response rates ranging
from about 4% to 10%. Oak Web Works, LLC, http://www.oakwebworks.com/portfolio/e-mar-
keting/emails-stats.htm (last visited Dec. 22, 2006).
40. Eight respondents did not indicate their occupation and were excluded from subsequent
analyses.
41. This is a statistical technique that identifies groups of items that are highly interrelated,
suggesting that those items are measuring the same underlying construct. For a detailed expla-
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measuring the same general concept.42 Accordingly, for each respon-
dent, the responses to each of the four items were then averaged into
a single measure of "perceived appropriateness" ranging from 1 (least
appropriate) to 7 (most appropriate). 43
B. Effect of the Purpose Manipulation
A preliminary analysis revealed that the gender of the respondents
affected several of our variables, so we included gender as a factor in
all subsequent analyses. 44 We conducted a series of statistical tests on
our 3x3x2x2 design (including gender) and discovered several statisti-
cally significant effects.45 By a wide margin, the largest influence on
the perceived appropriateness of the teacher's actions was the Pur-
pose manipulation-the teacher's motivation for breaking the rule. 46
In the cases where the teacher violated the blind-grading rule for nefa-
rious or ambiguous purposes, respondents' appropriateness ratings
were quite low (M = 1.80 and 2.01, respectively, on the 7-point
scale). 47 However, when there was a good reason for violating the
rule, the teacher's actions were rated as significantly more appropriate
(M = 4.37).48 This effect existed across all.other conditions in the
study, and within all strata of every demographic variable. This po-
tent effect overshadowed all others in the study, and exceeded the
strength of most empirical relationships in social, economic, or biolog-
ical science. 49
nation of factor analysis, see BARBARA G. TABACHNICK & LINDA S. FIDELL, USING MUL-
TIVARIATE STATISTICS (4th ed. 2001).
42. These questions were items numbered one to four on our questionnaire, which is attached
as an Appendix. Exploratory principal-axis factor analysis extracted a single factor accounting
for 76.4% of the total variance. Because only one factor was present, no factor rotation was
necessary. The measured reliability of the four items (Cronbach's Alpha) was 0.916.
43. For the purposes of these analyses, the individual values of the responses are less impor-
tant than their relative differences; an appropriateness rating of 3 means little in absolute terms,
but when comparing a rating of 3 to a rating of 6, the difference in perceived appropriateness is
clear.
44. In our sample, gender and occupation were related: our lawyer respondents were roughly
60% male, and our nonlawyer respondents were roughly 60% female. By including gender as a
factor in all analyses, it was possible to separate differences in responses due to gender from the
differences in responses due to occupation.
45. We used a 3x3x2x2 between-subjects analysis of variance. For an overview of analysis of
variance tests, and all subsequent statistical tests-e.g., simple effects, main effects, post-hoc
tests-see WILLIAM L. HAYS, STATISTICS (5th ed. 1994).
46. F (2,351) = 94.37, p < 0.0001; eta2 = 0.35.
47. Ratings did not significantly differ between the "bad" and "ambiguous" purpose
conditions.
48. Paired-comparisons using Tukey's HSD Post-hoc Test, ps < 0.001. See fig.].
49. The effect size expressed as a simple correlation would be 0.59.
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C. Effects of the Rule Strength Manipulation
Although there was a significant main effect of the Rule Strength
variable (absolute, opt-out, recommended), 50 the effect was moder-
ated by the respondents' occupation.51 A simple effects analysis ex-
amined the impact of the Rule Strength manipulation within each of
our occupation categories-lawyers and nonlawyers. This analysis re-
vealed that lay people in our sample were insensitive to the relative
strength of the rule governing the blind-grading policy.52 That is, their
judgment of the violation was not affected by the mandatory versus
advisory nature of the rule. However, the lawyers in our sample did
respond to the Rule Strength manipulation 53 and did so in the ex-
pected way: the teacher's actions were rated most inappropriate when
the rule was absolute (M = 2.29), less inappropriate when the rule
included an opt-out provision (M = 2.62), and most appropriate when
the rule was merely recommended (M = 3.34).54
50. Main effect of Rule Strength, F (2,351) = 3.14, p < 0.05; eta2 = 0.02.
51. A significant Rule Strength by occupation interaction (F (4,351) = 3.84, p < 0.05; eta' =
0.02) suggested that the Rule Strength variable was affecting members of one occupation differ-
ently from the other.
52. Nonlawyer respondents' judgments did not differ as a function of the Rule Strength ma-
nipulation, F (2,351) = 0.72, p = ns.
53. Significant simple effect of Rule Strength within lawyer respondents, F (2,351) = 9.97, p <
0.001.
54. See fig.2. In addition to the interaction with occupation, our Rule Strength conditions
interacted with the gender of our respondents. Rule Strength by Gender interaction, F (2,351) =
5.08, p < 0.01. Male respondents were more likely to base their judgments on the Rule Strength
(simple effect of Rule Strength within male respondents, F (2,351) = 11.01, p < 0.0001) than their
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D. Attitudes Toward Observance and Violation
Respondents were also asked questions about their general atti-
tudes toward rules when the violation of rules is necessary to achieve
desirable outcomes.55 Taken as a whole, these questions measure the
extent to which our respondents feel it is proper to follow rules re-
gardless of circumstance or outcome-a measure of "Rule Abiding-
ness." When examining the reactions to our scenarios, we found, as
one might expect, that respondents' measured endorsement of Rule
female counterparts (simple effect of Rule Strength within female respondents, F (2,351) = 2.47,
p = ns).
Furthermore, the Rule Strength manipulation interacted with the Purpose manipulation, but
the specific pattern of the interaction differed between the genders, F (4,351) = 3.06, p < 0.05. A
simple effects analysis of this interaction revealed that males responded uniformly to the Rule
Strength manipulation across all three purposes. In other words, males rated conduct more ap-
propriate as the purpose for the violation became better and those judgments did not vary as a
function of the absolute versus advisory nature of the rule, F (4,351) = 2.13, p = ns. However,
this was not the case with female respondents, F (4,351) = 3.67, p < 0.01. For female respon-
dents, the Rule Strength manipulation had an effect on judgments of acceptability but only when
there was a good reason for violating the blind-grading rule. The simple effect of Rule Strength
within the female subset of respondents was insignificant when the purpose was bad (F (2,351) =
0.47, p = ns) or ambiguous (F (2,351) = 1.22, p = ns). However, the effect was significant within
the good purpose condition, F (2,351) = 8.73, p < 0.001. Curiously, it was not the violation of the
absolute rule that was most frowned upon; rather, it was the opt-out version of the rule. In fact,
the respondents in this condition rated violations of the absolute and recommended rules as
equally acceptable (M = 5.14 and 5.00, respectively); however, violations of the required rule
received significantly less support (M = 3.18). Indeed, reactions to this condition were the princi-
pal difference between male and female judgments.
55. These were items five through eight on our questionnaire. See app. B.
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Abidingness was significantly correlated with their appropriateness
ratings.5 6 Those respondents who felt more strongly inclined to follow
rules rated the teacher's violation as less appropriate. 57
Examining each question ,individually provides some insight into
our respondents' general attitudes toward rules and rule violations. In
answering the question, "How important is it for people to abide by
legitimate/proper/legal/morally correct rules?", the mean response
was 6.38 (on a 7-point scale) (SD = 0.81), with 55% of respondents
choosing the most extreme response available and 85.5% choosing the
two most extreme responses.58 These results suggest that there exists
a remarkably strong consensus on the importance of obeying rules in
the abstract. On all other questions, responses averaged close to the
midpoint. These reflect a diverging dissensus: respondents spread
themselves quite widely across the spectrum of views.
On the question, "How important is it for people to make sure their
actions produce only good outcomes?", the mean was 4.62 (SD =
1.68).59 Because of the wide dispersion of responses, this does not
reflect a consensus that people consider the outcomes of conduct to be
only moderately important; people's views may simply diverge, with
more of them favoring a concern for good outcomes. Moreover, on
this question, a gender gap emerged: althodgh both sexes leaned to-
ward good outcomes, women (M = 4.85) valued them more than men
(M = 4.39).60
On the question, "In general, is. it more important to follow the
rules or make sure that your actions bring about good outcomes?",
respondents, though again spread widely, tilted toward the value of
following rules (M = 4.49, SD = 1.80)61 over ensuring good outcomes.
Again, a marginally significant gender gap emerged: although both
genders leaned toward the importance of following rules, men leaned
further (M = 4.62) than women (M = 4.34) did.62
Responses to the preceding questions suggest an unresolved-and
perhaps unresolvable-tension between the value of obeying proper
56. For the purpose of this analysis, the four general attitude items were combined into a
single composite score using principal-axis factor analysis, r = -0.377, p < 0.01.
57. The measure of Rule Abidingness accounted for 10.6% of the variability in appropriate-
ness ratings, second only to the Purpose manipulation.
58. That is, 85.5% of respondents indicated either a 6 or 7 on the 7-point scale. A t-test was
conducted to compare the average response to the midpoint (a neutral response). The responses
to this item differed significantly from the midpoint, t (399) = 59.43, p < 0.001.
59. This number differed significantly from the midpoint, t (400) = 7.94, p < 0.001.
60. F (1,385) = 5.06, p = 0.025.
61. Again, this number differed significantly from the midpoint, t (401) = 5.58, p < 0.001.
62. F (1,385) = 3.49, p = 0.062.
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rules and the value of ensuring that actions produce good outcomes.
The final question pitted these two values even more directly against
each other:
If you were faced with the choice of obeying a legitimate rule that
in the circumstance will produce a bad outcome, versus violating the
rule in order to bring about a good outcome, would you produce a
good outcome regardless of the rule or obey the rule regardless of
the outcome?
Though the mean came close to the midpoint of the scale (M = 3.86,
SD = 1.86),63 the real lesson here is how widely people's responses
diverged. The "obey the rule" side of the balance contained 41.4% of
responses, while 36.9% of responses were on the "produce a good out-
come" side, with the remaining 21.7% of respondents sitting on the
fence.
V. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION
The purpose for which a rule was violated made a dramatic differ-
ence to respondents of all types-lay people and lawyers, men and
women-and in all Rule Strength conditions. The effect size is im-
pressive. People found the violation of the blind-grading rule-a rule
adopted out of a widely recognized need and supported by the entire
community, including the person who ended up violating the rule-to
be decidedly more appropriate when the rule was broken in an effort
to achieve a socially desirable goal than when it was broken for less
noble purposes.
This finding suggests that people are concerned about more than
simply following a rule for the sake of obeying the rule. People are
apparently attentive to particularized circumstances and respect the
pursuit of the "right" outcome. Where that requires violation of the
rule, people appear willing to tolerate, forgive, or even approve of the
violation. This result seems inconsistent with the assumptions of
those, such as Justice Scalia, who believe that the thin rule of law is
sufficient to enlist the support of the populace. Thus, for example,
while the law treats intentional unlawful killings that are performed
with premeditation and deliberation as acts of first degree murder for
the purpose of establishing criminal liability-regardless of motive-
the public appears ready to make a major distinction between a mercy
63. Although it tilts toward the rules, the mean response does not differ significantly from the
midpoint (a neutral response), t (400) = 1.42, p = 0.15.
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killing of a beloved parent and a killing motivated by a greedy desire
to accelerate one's inheritance.64
Respondents did not, however, heartily approve of rule violations.65
The proper way to test whether the ratings reflect some degree of dis-
approval of the violation would be to have a control condition in
which the teacher followed the rule, enabling us to see whether that
condition was rated as being significantly more appropriate than a vio-
lation for even the best purposes. Alternatively, we might discover
that obedience to the rule is, under some conditions, regarded as less
appropriate than violation to achieve a more valued, socially desirable
end.
Where the goals of the law address weightier matters, such as obey-
ing criminal laws, we might find people less willing to tolerate depar-
tures from it. Also, where the purpose for the departure becomes
increasingly weighty, the violation might be viewed as increasingly jus-
tified. Even then, the central message is that people are paying atten-
tion to both the nature of the rule and the circumstances of the
violation, rather than blindly insisting on adherence to the rule.
The second experimental variable tested differences in people's re-
actions to violations of a rule when that rule was either mandatory,
contained an opt-out provision, or was merely advisory. Lay people
were insensitive to those differences: the violation of a mandatory
rule was regarded as no more inappropriate than the violation of what
amounted to a mere suggestion. Attorneys' ratings of the appropri-
ateness of the violation, however, showed significant differences as a
function of the mandatoriness of the rule. But even attorneys were
more sensitive to the purpose for the violation than they were to the
mandatoriness of the rule.
Thus, the goals motivating the rule violation were far more impor-
tant to judgments of appropriateness than the mandatoriness of the
rule-even for lawyers, who clearly treated violation of a mandatory
rule as more troubling than violation of an advisory rule. This cer-
tainly was so for lay people, for whom the degree of mandatoriness of
the rule made no difference at all.
When we asked people more abstract questions about the obliga-
tion to obey proper rules and the value of pursuing socially desirable
outcomes that may conflict with the rule, we see an interesting shift.
64. For findings consistent with this notion, see NORMAN J. FINKEL, COMMONSENSE JUSTICE:
JURORS' NOTIONS OF THE LAW (1995) and PAUL H. ROBINSON & JOHN M. DARLEY, JUSTICE,
LIABILITY, AND BLAME: COMMUNITY VIEWS AND THE CRIMINAL LAW (1995).
65. Even when the teacher had a good purpose for violating the rule, the measure of appropri-
ateness was still close to the midpoint.
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We found that the answers given in response to abstract questions are
quite different from the answers obtained by observing people's reac-
tions to more concrete dilemmas.
People overwhelmingly endorsed the importance of abiding by le-
gitimate, proper, legal, and morally correct rules.66 They were much
less definitive about the importance of making sure that one's actions
produce only good outcomes. Still, people leaned more toward en-
dorsing this value than rejecting it-hinting at the potential conflict
between these two values.
These findings, however, fly in the face of the judgments these same
people made when presented with a concrete scenario. There, they
readily forgave the violation of a legitimate, proper, legal, morally cor-
rect rule in deference to the attempt to produce a good outcome.
Their abstract pronouncements of devotion to obedience of rules are
contradicted by their readiness to forgive violations when the viola-
tion occurred in the pursuit of a good outcome.67
Next, the dilemma was posed explicitly, asking people whether it
was more important to follow the rules or to make sure that actions
brought about good outcomes, and whether it was more appropriate
to obey a legitimate rule that in the circumstance would produce a bad
outcome or to violate the rule in order to bring about a good out-
come.68 This dilemma produced collective uncertainty, with people
spreading themselves across the spectrum, whether endorsing one ex-
treme or the other, or sitting themselves right in the middle. Whether
this reflects individual differences (some lean toward obeying rules
and others lean toward pursuing good outcomes) or individual indefi-
niteness (the group distribution reflecting the uncertainties of most
individuals) is indeterminable from our data. Once again, it is appar-
ent that the seeming dilemma did not translate itself into the judg-
ments people made in the more concrete situation, where outcomes
seemed to matter more.
Individual differences were also noted. Lawyers were sensitive to
the obligation to obey under the rule's own terms while laypeople
were not. Although men and women leaned in the same directions,
women leaned further than men toward the value of producing good
outcomes while men leaned further than women toward the social ob-
66. The proper way to test whether this rating reflects some degree of disapproval would be to
have a control condition in which the teacher follows the rule.
67. The index of general attitudes accounted for only about one-third as much of the variance
in appropriateness ratings as did the experimentally manipulated Purpose variable.
68. On this item, recall that there was no significant tilt in either direction; respondents were
in equipoise.
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ligation to obey rules. And, perhaps most telling for the rule of law,
differences in the endorsement of the importance of following rules
predicted their judgments of the appropriateness of the rule violation
in our scenarios.
It may be, of course, that with changed rules or consequences-
involving weightier matters-the concrete scenarios would suggest
greater fidelity to rules over outcomes. But the present findings, like
those in other areas of social and behavioral research, suggest that
people's abstract rhetoric does a poor job of predicting their judg-
ments in concrete situations.69 People follow a much more flexible
situational ethic than they admit or even realize.
If these findings could be extrapolated to the conduct of political
leaders, they would suggest that whether a leader can safely disregard
the law depends on the justifications the leader can persuasively offer
for committing the violation. Moreover, when sanctions for the viola-
tion are in the hands of the electorate, forgiveness and even approval
may be readily available, depending on the actor's ostensible pur-
poses. Even the legal class would readily appreciate the justificatory
purposes of the violation, though they would treat it less forgivingly if
the rule was obligatory.
In a larger sense, are these findings an indication that the legal class
is more rigid and inflexible than the political class, whose useful expe-
diencies rule the day and benefit the populace? Or do the findings
suggest that an important function of law and lawyers is to serve as a
gyroscope that resists volatile or ill-considered changes of direction
that can flow from unlimited discretion? Perhaps the only answer is
that society benefits most from finding an effective balance between
continuity and change.
69. For similar phenomena in other areas of inquiry, see Michael J. Saks, Public Opinion
About the Civil Jury: Can Reality Be Found in the Illusions?, 48 DEPAUL L. REV. 221 (1998) and
the studies discussed therein.
[Vol. 56:615
2007] PUBLIC ATTITUDES TOWARD RULE VIOLATIONS 637
APPENDIX A
In 1999, after a ser. Lof high-profle cases of teachers inflating student-athletes' grades, Central fl gh School (CH5) began
exploring the adoption of a "btnd-grading" poky. In ful consultation wth parents, teachers, students, and other members
of the communty, in 2000 the CHS School Board adopted the foossing polcy:
final Examination Polcy
1. "Mr dGrading" is amethod for avoiding potential grade abuse by preventing teachers from knowing the
idenlitles of their students prior to submitting final grades to the Prindpal.
2. Al firal exatnations shal be bind-graded. There are no exceptions to this rule. No instructor may, under
any orcunstance, know the identity of any student prior to submision of final examination grades to thePr-opaL
3. Students vA be assigned anonymous "examination codes" pnor to taking the final and wsf only use those
codes on their fia. Names should not appear anywhere on the final examination.
The fEnal examarraton potcy had been recommended unartnouty to the School Board by al teachers. One of the
teachers at CHS, Lee Flowrs, taught a Grade 12 course in Amerncan Po~txs and Legal Insttutions." Flowers voted in favor
of the final exan"atin poly and was aware of its requiements when classes began In 2000. From 2000-2004, Flowers
folowed the powcy for a] final examnatiorns.
But 2005 was a difficut year because of two students. Morgan Brown and Pat Johnson were both students in Flvers'
class but they were very drferent from each other. Morgan was very argurnentatree, conrsistently showed up late for dass,
and was generaly disruptive. Pat, on tre other hand, was helpful in class, always on time, and was Flowers' favorite
student According to Flowers, "Pat was not a better student than Morgan. I just lked having Pat in class far more than
Morgan."
At the end of the school year, Powers handed out the Final examination and announced that the final examination pofi-y
would be ii force. Despite announcing that the Final exanr atior polcy woul be folowed, when the exairnations were
graded but not yet subitted to the Pnnopa, Flowers was curious to know how Morgan and Pat had done. As kick would
have s, the sdrool secretary in charge of exams had aceidentaly left the list of examcstion codes on a desk. Flowers,
seeing the list, quickly figured out what codes were assigned to Morgan and Pat and then checked the examinations to see
how they had done. Flowers wa  upset to see that Morgan. the disliked student, had received 92 points on the exam,
whle Pat, the lavorte. had only received 8 points out of 100.
Flowers then changed the grades, deducting 10 points from Morgan.and adding 10 to Pat. When later asked about the
change, Flowers meretly said: "snce the Final examunawzn was worth most of their overal grade, I thnk the altered grades
better reflect the knd of students I thought they were."
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APPENDIX B
Please answe the following questlons. You may ter back to the above stosy.
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